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† Raúl Castro has claimed Cuba has surprised those “who were wishing for chaos
to entrench and for Cuban socialism to collapse.” See: Manuel Roig-Franzia,
“Cuba’s Call for Economic Détente; Raúl Castro Hits Capitalist Notes While
Placating Hard-Line Party Loyalists,” Washington Post, July 27, 2007.
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Missteps and Next Steps 
in U.S.-Cuba Migration Policies
Robert Bach
“Instability” is the focal point that drives nearly all debates on U.S.-Cuban migration. Senior U.S. officials watch for it — the U.S.
Director of National Intelligence monitors Cuba closely for upheavals
that may lead to a migration crisis — while Cuban officials, concerned
that U.S actions will cause turmoil, accuse U.S. officials of violating
migration accords to create instability on the island.†
Instability, however, is not something that has to be watched for,
worried over, or surreptitiously created. It already exists. Instability
defines, structures, and drives the U.S.-Cuban relationship — one that
is beset by rumors, propaganda, and manipulation. The current chal-
lenge for U.S. policymakers is to forge stability and avoid unwise
steps that spiral into a crisis. Historically, cooperation between the
two governments has usually followed migration crises rather than
preceded them. After fifty years of tragic consequences, it is time to
reverse this trend; the sole course of action to do so is for the U.S.
and Cuba to cooperate to prevent migration crises.
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Stabilizing migration between Cuba and the United States calls for
changes in the way Cubans are treated under the Cuban Adjustment
Act of 1966. Along with the economic embargo, the 1966 Act is one
of the longest running sources of antagonism. At its inception, the
1966 Act made more sense. It responded to the presumption of per-
secution in Cuba at the height of revolutionary change and granted
Cubans, unlike other nationalities, legal permanent residency (a “green
card”) after only one year’s presence in the United States. The special
treatment encouraged Cuban refugees to adjust quickly to the United
States, supporting the U.S. government’s efforts through extensive
programs to cushion South Florida from the financial burden of reset-
tling waves of new refugees. Today, however, the Act has the effect
of encouraging illegal departures and disorderly migration.
Current U.S. policy works within a larger regional backdrop in
which Cuba shares economic pressures similar to its Caribbean neigh-
bors: it struggles to maintain long-term growth, and against poverty,
limited consumption, and, increasingly, the visible inequality between
wealthy tourists and the local populace. Such disparity results in
steady illegal departures throughout the region, but this disorderly
and often dangerous outflow does not necessarily signal political
upheaval. One of the most common migration mistakes over Cuba is
the U.S. failure to anticipate a level of “normal” flow, apart from bilat-
eral relations. That misconception and perhaps purposeful misunder-
standing can cause policy missteps. The U.S. and Cuba must build a
stabilizing legal framework to head off a crisis, recognizing that any
misunderstanding of each other’s intentions is a serious menace. U.S.
policies that have regime change as their first priority prevent coop-
eration on essential issues and cause harm to desired transitions in
Cuba.1 Preventing crises will depend on the willingness of both gov-
ernments to understand what to expect and participate with each
other in activities that serve both countries.
The Cuban Adjustment Act fosters this misunderstanding and serves
as an incentive for Cubans to take great risks — by crossing the Florida
Straits by raft or small boat, or risking money and life via human smug-
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gling routes. According to U.S. investigators, smugglers typically are not
paid until they deliver their Cuban passengers to dry land, after which
the Cuban Adjustment Act guarantees their legal status. In short, the
U.S. government encourages migrants to take unnecessary risk by offer-
ing a unique and exceptional reward unavailable to any other nation-
ality. For many families trying to reunite with their relatives, it also
makes the potential dangers of smuggling a little more acceptable.2
Unfortunately, cooperation in anti-
smuggling operations, which had been
one of the few areas of joint action, stalled
and succumbed to suspicions between the
two governments. Only in the last year or
so have U.S. federal authorities increased
enforcement against smugglers who bring
Cubans into South Florida. These efforts
reveal how a cooperative strategy could
make a critical difference. Investigations
show that many smugglers themselves are
Cuban migrants who recently crossed the
Florida Straits. The smuggling industry is
loosely fragmented and poorly organized,
but driven by lucrative profits — up to
$60,000 a trip. Joint U.S.-Cuba law enforce -
ment actions could save lives and significantly check what is still a
nascent rather than sophisticated underground industry.
Recent statistics show that human smuggling from Cuba increased
during the last five or six years, following similar trends throughout
the Caribbean.3 The Cuban flow expanded into new routes through
Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula, which mixed Cubans with Central
American migrants heading by land to the Texas border. Smugglers
also turned to “go-fast” boats that, until recently, could outrun most
Coast Guard vessels. Increased enforcement off the coast of Mexico
has Cuban migrants showing up in places in the Eastern Caribbean
where they have not been seen before.
The smuggling industry is
loosely fragmented and
poorly organized, but
driven by lucrative profits
—  up to $60,000 a trip.
Joint U.S.-Cuba law
enforcement actions 
could save lives and 
significantly check what 
is still a nascent rather
than sophisticated 
underground industry.
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A recent agreement between Mexico and Cuba offers a construc-
tive start for the region. It calls for increased cooperation between the
Mexican Navy and the Cuban Border Guard on smuggling and illegal
migration, and establishes terms for which Cuban citizens in Mexico
without proper legal status would be returned to Cuba. With the U.S.
Coast Guard also cooperating with the Mexican Navy in the Yucatán
Channel, a broader regional agreement would help all countries pre-
pare and participate in heading off smugglers adapting and searching
for new routes and means.
Paradoxically, one of the most significant potential missteps that
could trigger a U.S.-Cuban crisis could result from U.S. efforts to pre-
pare for exactly such an event.
The nightmare scenario that U.S. planners use today to prepare for
a migration crisis recalls the events of the 1980 boatlift from Cuba’s
Mariel harbor. The chaotic, spontaneous boatlift across the Florida
Straits brought 125,000 Cuban citizens without screening into the
United States in only a few months. The episode nearly provoked a
U.S. military response and caused such domestic turmoil that
President Carter attributed his reelection defeat in part to the public’s
reaction to the migration crisis.
Both governments made significant policy missteps in the midst of
the crisis. The roots of the crisis in Cuba involved an excessively harsh
halt to several years of free market experimentation. Domestic protest
spilled into the streets in Cuba in ways rarely seen since the Revolution.
But it was only after the U.S. stepped in to comment on the unrest and
invite Cuban citizens to leave the island that the Cuban government
took full advantage, turning the problem northward. Opening the bor-
der to families from Miami sending boats to pick up relatives, Cuba’s
government released tens of thousands of prisoners and hundreds of
mental patients who also took the ninety mile trip to Florida.
U.S. officials believe another boatlift could result from political insta-
bility in Cuba, and have developed a migration emergency plan, Operation
Vigilant Sentry, to pre-empt the presumed central lesson of Mariel:
uncontrolled outflow. The plan’s premise, as one U.S. official reports, is
† As an emergency response plan, Operation Vigilant Sentry has several
admirable features: an interagency command structure, asset mobilization, and
forward-thinking preparation of the Guantanamo base.
‡ The balsero — or rafter — crisis was spurred by the collapse of Soviet sponsor-
ship of Cuba, and its subsequent scarcity of food and other staples. Early
attempts to thwart escapees and blame the U.S. was followed by the Castro gov-
ernment threatening to unleash another mass exodus (similar to the Mariel crisis
in 1980). See: Daniel de Vise and Elane de Valle, “Cuban Balseros Helped
Change the Political Flavor of Florida,” Miami Herald, August 3, 2004.
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“[I]f there are signs of a mass migration … the Coast Guard plans to set
up a perimeter around Cuba”4 to intercept migrants and immediately
return them to Cuba, in hopes of discouraging more departures.
The plan calls for a massive operational deployment and an
unprecedented public relations campaign designed to convince
Cubans to stay onshore. But the U.S. strategy leaves the Cuban regime
with few policy options to avoid escalation of a crisis. Bottling up the
flow of refugees in the streets of Havana leaves the average Cuban cit-
izen in the middle of a dangerous standoff, and does little to resolve
whatever upheaval inside Cuba gave rise to a Mariel-style exodus.
Strategically, Operation Vigilant Sentry does not solve key underlying
problems and could even stand in the way of preemptive cooperation.†
The 1994 Migration Agreement, a step taken only after a migration
crisis,‡ set the stage for developing a more stable understanding of the
Cuban outflow and led to more appropriate U.S. responses. In partic-
ular, the Agreement recognized officially a normal non-political level
of emigration from Cuba that resembled the family and economic-
induced migration from countries throughout the region. Negotiators
agreed to an expected, normal number of annual departures. The
Agreement also promoted binational parallel and joint cooperative
activities to reduce disorderly movements from spinning out of con-
trol and becoming mass events. The Cuban government agreed, for
instance, to patrol its borders and notify the U.S. Coast Guard about
illicit departures from the island. The two governments agreed to a
process of returning those intercepted at sea back to Cuba without
repercussions.
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But rather than building on a gradually stabilizing legal framework
in advance of a new crisis, in 2004 the U.S. government under
President George W. Bush reversed course.
It imposed stricter limits on family visits, cash remittance flows,
travel, and professional exchanges to the island. The rationale was to
withhold from Cuba’s communist regime valuable financial assets
taken through taxes or local expenditures of U.S. dollars.
Ironically, family remittances are one of the only sources of sup-
port for Cuban households that confer semi-independence economi-
cally and socially from Cuban authorities. In this limited space of per-
sonal independence rests the seeds of liberty. Though relatively small,
remittances allow family members a greater range of choice about
their daily activities. By restricting remittances, U.S. authorities under-
mine their own goals, depriving families of simple survival benefits
and the support they need to be less dependent on the Cuban state.
In the same vein, suppressing family visits heightens the likelihood
of a migration crisis. In today’s transnational world, migration is a nor-
mal social endeavor. If there were no sanctions, Cuba would resemble
countries such as Mexico and the Dominican Republic with a substan-
tial share of its population dependent on family members earning
wages in the United States. Even under current constraints in Cuba,
rare visits with parents and relatives are more than personal — they
also provide income vital to household survival. Absent these stabiliz-
ing and predictable resources, Cuban families need to find alternate
means of support. Migrating northward, if and when they can, is one
of those alternatives.
In the U.S., migration out of Cuba is often projected through the
prism of politics. For example, the head of the U.S. Interests Section
in Havana interpreted an increase in migration as popular reaction to
Raúl Castro’s succession to power: “The numbers continue to rise —
that’s the response of the Cuban people. Why do so many people
want to leave the country?”5 Rather than political confrontation
through aggressive plans and warnings, however, the strategic chal-
lenge is to find alternatives to Cuba’s internal problems becoming U.S.
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problems. The U.S. goal should be to prevent decisions that raise the
migration issue to a high level national security concern.
Specific migration policy reforms would be a start. Greater oppor-
tunities for family visits and remittance flows, reform of the Cuban
Adjustment Act, joint anti-smuggling operations, and a reinvigorated
exchange of professionals would help reduce the systemic instability
that drives out-migration. Perhaps more importantly, reforms would
expand information flow between the countries. Increased trans-
parency and mutual understanding would reduce the extent to which
migration remains a central impasse between the U.S. and Cuba.
A first step: reinstitute temporary visits across the Florida Straits in
both directions. Temporary visits could be organized through various
visa regimes. If abuses exist with academic and professional exchanges,
as the Bush adminstration alleged, alternate exchange activities organ-
ized through respected institutions could be easily arranged.
Undoubtedly, temporary visas would help to depoliticize migration
processing.
Next, the U.S. needs to work with its regional partners to incorpo-
rate Cuba into the broad framework for addressing migration problems.
The arguments for and against visa and travel restrictions have been
played out repeatedly since the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Charges and countercharges of process manipulation cause recurring
tensions between the governments and must be corrected.
As part of these regional changes, the United States also needs to
reform the Cuban Adjustment Act. The United States now has better
ways to assist asylum seekers and humanitarian cases than the blanket
procedures of 1966, including principles and procedures that apply to
all nationalities. A modern U.S. asylum system provides protection
from persecution through case-by-case review, and contains mecha-
nisms for returning, if appropriate, those interdicted on land or sea to
their country of origin.
Repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act would also put an end to the
so-called wet foot/dry foot policy. The policy emerged in the early
1990s as a way to respond to the rafter crisis without repealing the
† National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell added, “And what my concern
is, there’s going to be some instability in that process.” See: Pablo Bachelet,
“U.S. Alerted to Cuba Migration, Chávez Weapons,” February 27, 2008.
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Cuban Adjustment Act.6 The compromise developed new rules on
whether a person could be returned to Cuba or not depending on
whether their interdiction occurred at sea or on land. Interdiction at
sea (wet foot) meant that the Cuban migrant was not yet covered by
the Cuban Adjustment Act. Once on land, the outdated law prevailed.
At the time, the compromise introduced a system of return to Cuba
for those who were interdicted at sea and helped to bring the Cuban
government a step closer toward a normal legal framework by
decriminalizing out-migration. It also moved U.S. policy toward treat-
ing all nationalities equivalently. Today, as part of a common, coop-
erative regional migration framework, both Cuba and the United
States could complete these earlier moves.
Still, while bilateral and multilateral reforms will be enormously
helpful, they will not be enough. The time has arrived for a new
vision of U.S.-Cuban relations. U.S. intelligence officials have put their
finger on the force that will propel future change. The key is “going
to be the fourth generation in Cuba” who are “thinking new thoughts”
and “asking hard questions.”† Of course, generational change is not
unique to Cuba. Generations of Cubans resettled in the United States
are also waiting and watching them, hopeful of change but not clear
on what it will bring. As both sides wait, opportunities are being lost.
Behind current preparations for a migration crisis is a failure to imag-
ine a new, stable Caribbean region. Both states will have to make seri-
ous reforms, internal and external, that recognize a normal migration
policy reflecting realities of poverty, family interdependence, and
regional vulnerabilities.
Despite a degree of “instability,” migration flows are part of nor-
mal, healthy international relations. They fuel economic cooperation,
stimulate vibrant exchange of business skills, and inspire citizens of
the region through exchanges, visits, and educational partnerships.
U.S.-CUBA MIGRATION POLICIES 41
Region-wide migration can become an instrument of innovation
and change. Regional engagement will replace decades of stalemate
and provide a new generation of Cubans with reasons to work con-
structively with the United States, and lend new generations of
Americans more insight into Cuba. A safe — and more stable —
movement of peoples throughout the region gives hope for an end to
fifty years of tragic consequences.
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